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Fidelity Diluted: Client Confidentiality Gives 
Way to the First Amendment & Social Media in 
Virginia State Bar, ex rel. Third District 
Committee v. Horace Frazier Hunter 
JAN L. JACOBOWITZ AND KELLY RAINS JESSON1 
“Nothing is more noble, nothing more venerable than fidelity.  
Faithfulness and truth are the most sacred excellences and endowments 
of the human mind.”2 Marcus Tullius Cicero 
 
Although Cicero shared his timeless wisdom in ancient Rome long 
before the Internet and the digital age became a part of the practice of 
law, fidelity remains the hallmark of the attorney-client relationship.  
Fidelity aside, the Internet has changed the manner in which attorneys 
and clients connect.  Today, social media is “permanently altering the 
way that potential clients . . . evaluate their need for legal services and 
identify and select the lawyer best-suited to serve those needs.”3  
Arguably, attorneys are remiss if they are not entering cyberspace to 
attract new clients. 
In fact, the 2012 American Bar Association (ABA) Legal Technology 
Survey Report indicates that fifty-five percent of law firms surveyed have 
a presence on Facebook, and thirty-eight percent of attorneys have their 
own Facebook page.4  Some of the other major social networking 
 
 1. Jan L. Jacobowitz is a Lecturer in Law and Director of the Professional 
Responsibility & Ethics Program at the University of Miami School of Law.  Kelly Rains 
Jesson is a 2012 graduate of the University of Miami School of Law where she was a 
Fellow in the Professional Responsibility & Ethics Program. 
 2. TRYON EDWARDS, A DICTIONARY OF THOUGHTS: BEING A CYCLOPEDIA OF LACONIC 
QUOTATIONS FROM THE BEST AUTHORS IN THE WORLD, BOTH ANCIENT AND MODERN 176 (F. 
B. Dickerson, Co. 1908). 
 3. Niki Black & Carolyn Elefant, Social Media: What It Is and Why It Matters, ABA 
LAW PRACTICE TODAY (Jan. 2010), http://apps.americanbar.org/lpm/lpt/articles/ftr01102. 
shtml (“Social media gives lawyers the tools to provide potential clients with the kind of 
in-depth information that they’ve come to expect online prior to making any kind of 
decision requiring a significant commitment of resources.”). 
 4. Robert Ambrogi, ABA Survey Shows Growth in Lawyers’ Social Media Use, 
LAWSITES (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.lawsitesblog.com/2012/08/aba-survey-shows-
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options for attorneys include Twitter,5 LinkedIn,6 and blog websites.7  
Twitter use among attorneys and law firms has nearly doubled in one 
year.8  LinkedIn use is prevalent among firms and individual attorneys 
with eighty-eight percent of firms and ninety-five percent of individual 
attorneys retaining accounts.9  Finally, the survey “not surprisingly” 
shows that the number of attorneys writing blogs has also grown.10  
Among law firms and individual attorneys, twenty-two percent and nine 
percent, respectively, maintain professional blogs.11  Nearly 40 percent of 
attorneys stated that their blogs generated new business for them.12 
Given the lower percentage of attorneys writing blogs relative to 
those attorneys posting on Facebook and LinkedIn, blogging may be the 
newest marketing frontier for attorneys and the one where an attorney 
or firm may currently have the least competition.  Many bloggers link 
their blogs to other social media websites and to their firm websites, 
thereby further enhancing their Internet marketing presence.13 
Horace Hunter is one such attorney who not only writes a blog, but 
also links the blog to his firm website.14  The blog is titled “This Week in 
Richmond Criminal Defense,” and it chronicles cases and issues arising 
 
growth-in-lawyers-social-media-use.html.  The ABA sent questionnaires to 12,500 ABA-
member lawyers in private practice and 823 of the lawyers completed the questionnaires. 
Id. 
 5. TWITTER, https://twitter.com/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2013). 
 6. LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2013). 
 7. E.g., TYPEPAD, http://www.typepad.com/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2013). 
 8. Ambrogi, supra note 4. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.  This is up from fifteen percent of firms with blogs in 2011 and fourteen 
percent in 2010. Id.  The amount of individual attorneys with blogs is up from five 
percent in both 2011 and 2010. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See William R. Peterson & Clark E. Smith, Law Firm Websites: An Ethical 
Minefield, THE BENCHER, (Jan./Feb. 2013), http://home.innsofcourt.org/for-members/ 
current-members/the-bencher/recent-bencher-articles/januaryfebruary-2013/law-firm-
websites-an-ethical-minefield.aspx.  In fact: 
In today’s world, law firms are expected to have websites.  Even more than the 
office, the website is the public face of the law firm, providing information and 
an introduction to clients, colleagues, and even new employees.  Easy to 
modify and with nearly endless reach, websites are a powerful and effective tool 
for lawyers. 
Id. 
 14. See This Week in Richmond Criminal Defense, HUNTER & LIPTON PC, http:// 
hunterlipton.com/news.php (last visited Oct. 27, 2013). 
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in the criminal justice system.15  Hunter primarily writes about his own 
clients and cases, although he has indicated that his goal in writing the 
blog is to expose issues of public importance.16  Hunter conceded that 
the blog also serves a commercial purpose.17 
Hunter’s blog became the subject of national attention this year, but 
not because of the issues that he writes about.  Rather, the blog became 
another test case that demonstrates the challenges that arise in applying 
the traditional legal ethics rules on confidentiality and advertising to the 
Internet in the new digital age practice of law.  The Virginia State Bar 
found Hunter’s blog to be problematic in two ways: as a form of 
misleading advertising and as a violation of client confidentiality.18  
Why?  The short answer is that many of the blog articles were written 
about Hunter’s own clients, some containing the clients’ actual names, 
without their consent and without a required attorney advertising 
disclaimer warning the reader that the case results being profiled were 
not necessarily results that the reader could expect in his own case.19 
As the case wound its way through the Virginia state courts and 
ultimately into a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court, which was recently denied,20 many First Amendment 
and legal ethics lawyers debated the Virginia Bar’s position.21  The 
Supreme Court of Virginia held that Hunter must add a disclaimer to his 
blog articles, which remains the subject of some debate.22  However, 
perhaps the more controversial position is the Supreme Court of 
Virginia’s holding that to deny Hunter the ability to speak about his 
clients’ cases, after the case concludes and based upon what is found in 
the public record, is to deny Hunter his First Amendment right of free 
speech.23 
This Article will focus on the First Amendment confidentiality 
issue, as this part of the decision arguably undermines the long-standing 
legal ethics rule of confidentiality and strikes at the heart of the attorney-
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Hunter v. Va. State Bar ex rel. Third Dist. Comm., 744 S.E.2d 611, 614 (Va. 
2013), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2871 (2013). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Brief for Appellee at 2, Hunter, 744 S.E.2d 611 (No. 121472). 
 20. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hunter, 744 S.E.2d 611, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
2871 (June 24, 2013) (No. 12-1379). 
 21. See, e.g., Brief for VA. Assoc. of Broad. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, 
Hunter, 744 S.E.2d 611. 
 22. Hunter, 744 S.E.2d at 620–21. 
 23. Id. at 620. 
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client relationship as it has been defined and has evolved since the late 
nineteenth century.  Ultimately, the central issue for the legal profession 
is whether an attorney’s relationship with a client, and the simultaneous 
duty of confidentiality owed to the client, survives the completion of the 
case, notwithstanding what may appear in a public record and regardless 
of First Amendment considerations. 
In an attempt to provide necessary context for the discussion, this 
Article will explore the various aspects of the definition of attorney-
client relationship and review the history, evolution, and moral 
underpinnings of the ethical rule of client confidentiality. Next, this 
Article will look at these contextual puzzle pieces in conjunction with 
Virginia’s Rule 1.624 and the Hunter case25 in an effort to determine 
whether the Supreme Court of Virginia has attempted to add a piece to 
the confidentiality puzzle, or instead, has designed its own new 
confidentiality rubric.  Finally, this Article will discuss the juxtaposition 
of the rule of confidentiality with the First Amendment and offer a 
perspective on the potential impact of the Supreme Court of Virginia’s 
decision on the legal profession and the public. 
I. DEFINING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP 
The attorney-client relationship has been defined throughout the 
years in terms of agency, fiduciary, contract, and tort law.26  Regardless 
of which definition is applied, confidentiality is a critical element of the 
relationship. 
For example, when described in terms of an agency relationship, 
the attorney is defined as the agent and the client as the principal.27  The 
attorney is given the power to act on behalf of the client and is to do so 
in accordance with the accompanying duties of loyalty and 
confidentiality.28  In fact, the attorney’s duty to maintain client 
confidences has been identified as such a fundamental aspect of the 
agency relationship that it attaches to a preliminary consultation, even if 
no ongoing attorney-client relationship is established, and continues 
 
 24. VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2004), available at http://www.vsb.org/ 
docs/2009-10-pg-rpc.pdf. 
 25. See Hunter, 744 S.E.2d 611. 
 26. See infra notes 27, 32, 37, and 39 and accompanying text. 
 27. John M. Burman, A Lawyer’s Fiduciary Duties, WYO. LAWYER, Oct. 2004, at 42, 
42. 
 28. Id. 
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even after the relationship is terminated.29  Naturally, an attorney 
functions somewhat differently than a traditional agent in that the client 
does not control all of the actions of the attorney, but the client does 
provide the authority for the attorney to act on the client’s behalf.30  
More importantly, attorney-client agency is often distinguished from the 
typical agency relationship by the fact that the duty of confidentiality 
survives the termination of the agency relationship.31 
The duty of confidentiality is also central to the definition of the 
attorney-client relationship when the attorney serves in a fiduciary role 
for the client.  The fiduciary definition highlights the distinctive nature 
of the attorney as an agent who is authorized, but not controlled by, the 
principal.32  In other words, a fiduciary may be “a person to whom 
another person’s affairs are entrusted in circumstances that often make it 
difficult or undesirable for that other person to supervise closely the 
performance of the fiduciary.”33  Thus, under this definition, the attorney 
becomes a fiduciary simultaneously with the formation of the attorney-
client privilege34 and is immediately “in a relationship of trust and 
confidence to a client.”35  In fact, “[t]he relationship between an attorney 
and client is a fiduciary relationship of the very highest character.  All 
 
 29. Douglas R. Richmond, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Associated Confidentiality 
Concerns in the Post-Enron Era, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 381, 395 (2005).  “Lawyers’ duty to 
maintain client confidences is a fundamental agency law principle.” Id. at 394.  “[This] 
duty of confidentiality attaches to initial consultations and preliminary communications, 
even if no attorney-client relationship ultimately results, and continues after 
representation concludes.” Id. at 395.  The duty of confidentiality is quite broad, and any 
exceptions that apply are typically very narrow. Id. at 395. 
 30. Grace M. Giesel, Client Responsibility for Lawyer Conduct: Examining the Agency 
Nature of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 86 NEB. L. REV. 346, 350–51 (2007).  See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14N cmt. a (1958) (“[A]ttorneys . . . are 
independent contractors . . . since they are contractors but, although employed to 
perform services, are not subject to the control or right to control of the principal with 
respect to their physical conduct in the performance of the services.  However, they fall 
within the category of agents.”).  Attorneys are also seen to be “special agents” because 
they are not engaged in continuing services; rather, they are authorized to perform one 
transaction or a series of transactions. See Giesel, at 353. 
 31. Burman, supra note 27, at 42 (“After the termination of the agency, the 
obligation of confidentiality imposed by the law of agency is modified, though the ethical 
obligation remains nearly the same, as does the fiduciary obligation.”). 
 32. See id. at 43. 
 33. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 cmt. b 
(2000)). 
 34. Alvin O. Boucher, North Dakota Legal Malpractice: A Summary of the Law, 70 
N.D. L. REV. 615, 620 (1994). 
 35. Kaseberg v. Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP, 265 P.3d 777, 782 (Or. 2011). 
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dealings between an attorney and his client that are beneficial to the 
attorney will be closely scrutinized with the utmost strictness for any 
unfairness.”36 
The attorney-client relationship is also expressed as a relationship 
evidenced by an express or implied contract.37  Generally, the attorney 
and client each sign a retainer letter that expresses the essential terms of 
their agreement.38  However, an attorney-client relationship may arise as 
a result of an implied contract, evidenced by the parties’ conduct and 
intent to establish the relationship.39  In the absence of an express 
agreement, the attorney-client relationship has also been defined based 
upon a tort theory when it is found to be reasonably foreseeable that an 
individual who seeks and receives legal advice will rely on that advice.40 
Thus, whether the emphasis is placed upon the agency, fiduciary, 
contract, or tort theory of law, an attorney-client relationship is one in 
which loyalty, trust, and the inherent duty of confidentiality are vitally 
important and well-recognized in the law of lawyering and legal ethics. 
II. THE ETHICAL DUTY OF CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT RELATIONSHIP 
The historical roots of the ethical duty of confidentiality are found 
in the Alabama Bar Association’s 1887 Code of Ethics from which the 
 
 36. Lee v. State Bar of Cal., 472 P.2d 449, 457 (Cal. 1970).  See also In re 
Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1071, (N.Y. 1994) (“The duty to deal fairly, honestly and 
with undivided loyalty superimposes onto the attorney-client relationship a set of special 
and unique duties, including maintaining confidentiality, avoiding conflicts of interest, 
operating competently, safeguarding client property and honoring the clients’ interests 
over the lawyer’s.”). 
 37. Ingrid A. Minott, Note, The Attorney-Client Relationship: Exploring the Unintended 
Consequences of Inadvertent Formation, 86 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 269, 276–78 (2009). 
 38. Id. at 275. 
 39. Id. at 274–75 (describing that an attorney-client relationship is contractual in 
nature, may be express or implied, and whether an employment relationship actually 
exists in any given case will depend upon the application of the rules of contract law).  
See also Kiger v. Balestri, 376 S.W.3d 287, 290–91 (Tex. App. 2012) (“The attorney-
client relationship is a contractual relationship that arises from a lawyer’s agreement to 
render professional services to a client.”); Koo v. Rubio’s Rests, Inc., 109 Cal. App. 4th 
719, 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (“An attorney-client relationship is not created by the 
unilateral declaration of one party to the relationship. . . .  Rather, the relationship can 
only be created by contract, express or implied.”). 
 40. See Boucher, supra note 34, at 619; see also Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & 
Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 693 (Minn. 1980). 
6
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ABA initial Canon of Professional Ethics (1908 Canons) was drafted and 
adopted in 1908.41  Canon 37, adopted in 1928, provided: 
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client’s confidences.  This duty 
outlasts the lawyer’s employment, and extends as well to his employees; 
and neither of them should accept employment which involves or may 
involve the disclosure or use of these confidences, either for the private 
advantage of the lawyer or his employees or to the disadvantage of the 
client, without his knowledge and consent, and even though there are 
other available sources of such information.42 
Thus, the 1908 Canons embodied the legal concepts of agency, 
fiduciary, and contract by concluding that client consent was required to 
reveal client confidences and specified that disclosure was 
impermissible, “even though there are other available sources of such 
information.”43  The 1908 Canons were replaced in 1969 when the ABA 
adopted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code).44  
Along with the Model Code came a new disciplinary rule governing 
client confidentiality.  Disciplinary Rule 4-101 provides, in relevant part: 
Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a Client 
(A) -“Confidence” refers to information protected by the attorney-client 
privilege under applicable law, and “secret” refers to other information 
gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be 
held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or 
would be likely to be detrimental to the client. 
(B) -Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not 
knowingly: 
 
 41. David F. Chavkin, Why Doesn’t Anyone Care About Confidentiality? (And, What 
Message Does This Send to New Lawyers?), 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 239, 242–43 (2012). 
 42. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 37 (1937).  The remainder of 
Canon 37 provided: 
A lawyer should not continue employment when he discovers that this 
obligation prevents the performance of his full duty to his former or to his new 
client. 
  If a lawyer is accused by his client, he is not precluded from disclosing the 
truth in respect to the accusation.  The announced intention of a client to 
commit a crime is not included within the confidences which he is bound to 
respect.  He may properly make such disclosures as may be necessary to 
prevent the act or protect those against whom it is threatened. 
Id. 
 43. Id.  There were exceptions to Canon 37’s rule of confidentiality, as indicated in 
footnote 42, but those exceptions are not relevant to the facts of Hunter. 
 44. Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org 
/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct.h
tml (last visited Oct. 28, 2013). 
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(1) -Reveal a confidence or secret of his client. 
(2) -Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the 
client. 
(3) -Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of 
himself or of a third person, unless the client consents after full 
disclosure.45 
Once again, client confidentiality is sacrosanct.  Although the 
language of the rule changes Canon 37 and specifically adds the word 
“secret” to further define confidential information, the rule makes 
disclosure impermissible absent consent of the client or if disclosure 
would be embarrassing or detrimental.46  Most states have adopted some 
version of the Model Code, including Virginia.47 
The Model Code Disciplinary Rule 4-101 draws a distinction 
between “confidences,” covered by the attorney-client privilege, and 
client “secrets.”48  Attorney-client privilege is a concept from the law of 
evidence.49  The client, acting through his attorney, may claim the 
 
 45. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1980).  The remainder of the 
rule provides the following exceptions, although they are not directly relevant to this 
discussion: 
(C) -A lawyer may reveal: 
(1) -Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients 
affected, but only after a full disclosure to them. 
(2) -Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or 
required by law or court order. 
(3) -The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information 
necessary to prevent the crime. 
(4) -Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to 
defend himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of 
wrongful conduct. 
(D) -A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees, 
associates, and others whose services are utilized by him from disclosing or 
using confidences or secrets of a client, except that a lawyer may reveal the 
information allowed by DR 4-101(C) through an employee. 
Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AM. BAR ASS’N CTR. 
FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_ 
responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopti
ng_model_rules.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2013). 
 48. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101. 
 49. Sue Michmerhuizen, Confidentiality, Privilege:  A Basic Value in Two Different 
Applications, AM. BAR ASS’N CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, (May 2007), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/ 
confidentiality_or_attorney.authcheckdam.pdf. 
8
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privilege to prevent disclosure of communications that have actually 
occurred between the client and his attorney.  However, the privilege 
only protects information shared for the purpose of legal 
representation.50  On the other hand, client “secrets” can be any 
information that would be embarrassing or detrimental to the client if 
disclosed by the attorney, regardless of the source or purpose for the 
communication.51 
Client confidentiality was again revisited when the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct replaced the Model Code in 1983.52  When the 
1983 Model Rule for confidentiality, Rule 1.6, was adopted, the relevant 
portion provided: “A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, 
except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out 
the representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).”53 
The 1983 model rule removes the reference to confidences and 
secrets, and broadens the rule to include any “information relating to 
representation of a client.”54  The definition simultaneously reinforces 
the historical and legal foundation for client confidentiality and is the 
most broadly encompassing definition to date.  An attorney is prohibited 
from disclosing any information relating to the representation of a client 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101. 
 52. Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar. 
org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_condu
ct.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2013). 
 53. AM. BAR ASS’N CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF 
DELEGATES 51 (1987).  The remainder of the rule contained the following exceptions: 
1.6(b): A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent that the lawyer 
reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer 
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or 
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy 
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal 
charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the 
client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding 
involving the lawyer’s representation of the client. 
Id. 
 54. See id.  Although Rule 1.6 was again amended in 2002 and 2003, the 
amendments do not pertain to the definition of confidential information.  See Chavkin, 
supra note 41, at 254. 
9
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without client consent, absent an exception noted in the rule.55  There is 
no exception provided in the rule for public record information.  Forty-
nine states have adopted the ABA Model Rules, however, various states 
have made their own modifications to the rules.56  Notably, Virginia has 
retained the language of confidences and secrets in its confidentiality 
rule, as will be more fully discussed below.57 
III. THE PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY 
There has been much scholarly writing and debate about the 
appropriate breadth of confidentiality that attaches to the attorney-client 
relationship.  The discussion often focuses on whether an additional 
exception to the rule should be created, such as an exception to release 
historical information,58 to protect others against environmental 
hazards,59 or to release information that would prevent an innocent 
individual from being prosecuted and convicted.60  Inevitably, the 
debaters examine the underlying policies at play in protecting a client’s 
confidentiality. 
For example, in 2003, Susan R. Martyn, defending confidentiality as 
defined in the newly released Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers and in the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission revisions to the Model 
Rules, describes “two distinct but complimentary” moral justifications 
for confidentiality.61  She explains that the “true believers” of utilitarian 
philosophy, who evaluate conduct by considering the greatest good for 
the greatest number, support confidentiality because it in turn supports 
the functioning of the legal system and an attorney’s ability to function 
in that system.62  The legal system is a beneficial societal alternative to 
 
 55. See AM. BAR ASS’N CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, The Legislative History, supra 
note 53, at 51. 
 56. AM. BAR ASS’N CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, State Adoption, supra note 47. 
 57. See VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2004). 
 58. Patrick Shilling, Note, Attorney Papers, History and Confidentiality: A Proposed 
Amendment to Model Rule 1.6, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2741, 2751, 2767 (2001). 
 59. Irma S. Russell, Cries and Whispers: Environmental Hazards, Model Rule 1.6, and 
the Attorney’s Conflicting Duites to Clients and Others, 72 WASH. L. REV. 409, 411–15 
(1997). 
 60. Shilling, supra note 58, at 2749 n.75. 
 61. Susan R. Martyn, In Defense of Client-Lawyer Confidentiality . . . And its 
Exceptions . . ., 81 NEB. L. REV. 1320, 1322–23 (2003). 
 62. Id. at 1323–24. 
10
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol36/iss1/3
3. JACOBOWITZ_FINAL 1/17/2014  5:40 PM 
2013] FIDELITY DILUTED 85 
disparate results and chaos; therefore, confidentiality benefits the greater 
good.63 
On the other hand, the deontological justifications focus upon an 
analysis of the “motive of the actor, rather than by the consequences the 
actor produces.”64  Deontologists seek universal rules that reflect respect 
for individual rights.65  Martyn suggests that a deontological approach 
may begin with a focus on law as the protector of individual rights.66  
When an attorney agrees to represent a client and sets out to protect his 
individual rights, the client is afforded respect by the tacit understanding 
that his privacy will be protected through the implicit or explicit 
promise of confidentiality.67  She suggests that this protection of client 
autonomy and privacy serves as the primary basis for the fiduciary duty 
ascribed to the attorney-client relationship in both agency law and the 
legal ethics codes.68 
The importance of confidentiality has also been analyzed in terms of 
the attorney’s specific role in society.  In an article arguing for a narrow 
exception to confidentiality for environmental hazards, Irma S. Russell 
explores the definitions of “lawyer as champion” and “lawyer as officer of 
the court.”69  She explains that the lawyer as champion role considers 
confidentiality to be intrinsic to the attorney-client relationship and to 
be an absolute, critical value: 
This view is premised on the belief that the duty of confidentiality is a 
nonnegotiable element of our judicial system that must not be 
overridden except in cases so dramatic that reporting should occur in 
spite of any rule.  It assumes that releasing the attorney’s pledge of 
silence endangers the protections of the advocacy system of justice. . . .  
  The view of the attorney as champion has long historical precedent.  
Courts, scholars, and boards of professional responsibility speak of the 
lawyer’s duty of “single allegiance,” “absolute loyalty,”
 
and “undivided 
fidelity” to the client.70  
 
 63. Id. at 1322–24.  Martyn also notes that utilitarian naysayers, such as Jeremey 
Benthem, have used utilitarian reasoning to argue against confidentiality as protecting 
the guilty, hiding information, and therefore, going against the public good. Id. at 1324. 
 64. Id. at 1328. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1329. 
 69. Russell, supra note 59, at 448–52. 
 70. Id. at 448–49 (citing Moritz v. Med. Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. 865, 872 (W.D. 
Wis. 1977); Parsons v. Cont’l Nat’l Am. Grp., 550 P.2d 94 (Ariz. 1976); Am. Emp’rs Ins. 
Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties, Inc., 131 N.Y.S.2d 393, 401 (N.Y. App. Div. 1954); ABA 
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The lawyer as officer of the court and as protector of the rule of law 
fits more into the utilitarian definition of a lawyer as someone who 
benefits the societal good, as well as the overall legal system.71  Russell 
notes that the lawyer as officer of the court both incorporates and 
qualifies the role of the lawyer as champion.72  The lawyer still plays a 
role as champion for the individual, but not at all costs to the legal 
system.73  In other words: 
The focus of this model is the obligation of the attorney to the system as 
a whole: the champion must play by the rules.  While recognizing the 
attorney has a duty of loyalty to the client, this model sets limits on the 
duty, reminding us that the attorney’s duty has never been to win at all 
costs.  The attorney has no duty to keep the client’s secrets, for example, 
if to keep quiet would perpetrate fraud on the court.74 
Thus, the lawyer as officer of the court provides support for exceptions 
to the rule of confidentiality to uphold candor to the tribunal and to 
prevent bodily harm to another.  It takes into consideration the 
deontological concerns for rights of the individual, but at the same time 
paves the way for the utilitarian notions of benefiting the legal system 
and society as a whole. 
Other scholars, such as David F. Chavkin, who argue on behalf of 
confidentiality and suggest modifications to the current Model Rule 1.6 
to enhance compliance, have integrated these ideas to speak more 
generally about confidentiality’s role in enhancing the legal system.75  
Chavkin discusses the value of confidentiality as a vehicle for  
establishing trust by encouraging open communication between an 
attorney and his client.76  This allows the attorney not only to provide 
better representation to the client, but also gives the attorney an 
opportunity to dissuade a client from committing a crime who shares 
such an intention.77 
 
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 6 (1908); Steven H. Goldberg, The Former Client’s 
Disqualification Gambit: A Bad Move in Pursuit of an Ethical Anomaly, 72 MINN. L. REV. 
227, 235 (1987)). 
 71. Russell, supra note 59, at 451–52. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 452. 
 74. Id. (citing CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.7.3 at 301 (West 
1986); Michael K. McChrystal, Lawyers and Loyalty, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 367 
(1992)). 
 75. Chavkin, supra note 41, at 255–57. 
 76. Id. at 256. 
 77. Id. 
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Chavkin notes that some scholars doubt the utilitarian aspect of this 
justification.78  However, he also explains that others believe that an 
attorney, as a private agent, owes no obligation to the public good to 
reveal client confidences.79  Further, because an attorney is essential to 
guard an individual’s rights in the legal system, confidentiality is 
fundamental to the protection of individual autonomy, thus defaulting to 
the deontological values of the motive of the actor and individual 
rights.80 
Regardless of whether confidentiality is defined by general 
philosophical principles of morality, by the specific labels society 
attaches to an attorney’s role, or by focusing on the general importance 
that confidentiality plays in legal ethics, confidentiality is clearly 
fundamental to the attorney-client relationship.  Any exceptions that 
permit a breach of fidelity should be narrow and should be governed by 
a critical need to protect the greater good. 
IV. VIRGINIA’S RULE OF CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY 
As mentioned above, Virginia did not adopt all of the language 
contained in Model Rule 1.6, however, it retained the language of 
confidences and secrets.81  The notes to Virginia’s rule indicate that the 
ABA’s language that incorporates “all information relating to the 
representation” was rejected as being too broad.82  However, comment 3 
to the rule, reprinted below, distinguishes the attorney-client privilege 
and explains that confidentiality, within the context of the embarrassing 
or detrimental limitation, includes information gained in the 
professional relationship, “whatever its source.”83 
The sections that are directly relevant to the discussion of the 
Hunter case read as follows: 
Confidentiality of Information 
 (a) A lawyer shall not reveal information protected by the attorney-
client privilege under applicable law or other information gained in the 
professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate 
or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to 
be detrimental to the client unless the client consents after consultation, 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2004). 
 82. Id. Virginia Code Comparison. 
 83. Id. cmt 3. 
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except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out 
the representation, and except as stated in paragraphs (b) and (c).84 
Comment 
[1] The lawyer is part of a judicial system charged with upholding the 
law. One of the lawyer’s functions is to advise clients so that they avoid 
any violation of the law in the proper exercise of their rights. 
[2] The common law recognizes that the client’s confidences must be 
protected from disclosure.  The observance of the ethical obligation of a 
lawyer to hold inviolate confidential information of the client not only 
facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation 
of the client but also encourages people to seek early legal assistance. 
[2a] Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to 
determine what their rights are and what is, in the maze of laws and 
regulations, deemed to be legal and correct.  Based upon experience, 
lawyers know that clients usually follow the advice given, and the law is 
upheld. 
[2b] A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the 
lawyer maintain confidentiality of information relating to the 
representation.  The client is thereby encouraged to communicate fully 
and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging 
subject matter. 
[3] The principle of confidentiality is given effect in two related bodies 
of law, the attorney-client privilege (which includes the work product 
doctrine) in the law of evidence and the rule of confidentiality 
established in professional ethics.  The attorney-client privilege applies 
in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a 
witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client.  
The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than 
those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of 
law.  The confidentiality rule applies not merely to matters 
communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information 
protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law or other 
information gained in the professional relationship that the client has 
requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be 
embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client, whatever 
its source.  A lawyer may not disclose such information except as 
authorized or required by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other 
law. 
. . .  
 
 84. VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6. 
14
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol36/iss1/3
3. JACOBOWITZ_FINAL 1/17/2014  5:40 PM 
2013] FIDELITY DILUTED 89 
Disclosure Adverse to Client 
[6b] The confidentiality rule is subject to limited exceptions.  However, 
to the extent a lawyer is required or permitted to disclose a client’s 
confidences, the client will be inhibited from revealing facts which 
would enable the lawyer to counsel against a wrongful course of action.  
The public is better protected if full and open communication by the 
client is encouraged than if it is inhibited. 
. . . 
Former Client 
[18] The duty of confidentiality continues after the client-lawyer 
relationship has terminated.85 
Thus, Virginia’s rule of confidentiality and the interpretive 
comments clearly reference the importance of confidentiality both from 
a utilitarian perspective and from a deontological perspective.  Comment 
1 identifies the attorney as a central figure in our judicial system whose 
advice assists in maintaining the rule of law and encouraging individuals 
to be law-abiding members of society.86  Comment 2a also acknowledges 
that attorneys’ advice is usually followed and thus contributes to the law 
being upheld.87  Comment 6b further supports the utilitarian view, 
noting that confidentiality encourages “full and open communication by 
the client,” which better protects the public.88 
The comments to Virginia’s Rule 1.6 also reflect the deontological 
aspect of confidentiality as it contributes to the preservation of 
individual rights.  Comment 2 acknowledges that the right to 
confidential communication stems from the common law and is essential 
for proper representation, and comment 2a reflects the fact that 
individuals need lawyers to understand and protect individual rights.89  
Comment 6b reinforces the need for confidentiality so that a client will 
communicate fully in an effort to gain appropriate representation.90 
As mentioned above, comment 3 distinguishes the attorney-client 
privilege from confidentiality and explains: 
The confidentiality rule applies not merely to matters communicated in 
confidence by the client but also to all information protected by the 
attorney-client privilege under applicable law or other information 
 
 85. Id. cmts. 1, 2, 2a, 2b, 3, 6b, 18. 
 86. Id. cmt. 1. 
 87. Id. cmt. 2a. 
 88. Id. cmt. 6. 
 89. Id. cmts. 2, 2a. 
 90. Id. cmt. 6b. 
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gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be 
held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or 
would be likely to be detrimental to the client, whatever its source.91  
Finally, comment 18 secures a client’s right to confidentiality after 
the attorney-client relationship is terminated.92  The language of the rule 
combined with comment 3 and comment 18 begs the question of how an 
attorney is allowed to write a blog that reveals little known information 
from a public record, in a criminal matter, after the termination of a 
case, when that information without a doubt would be embarrassing or 
likely would be detrimental to the client?  The Supreme Court of 
Virginia answered that question by invoking the First Amendment—a 
result that probes further consideration.  
V. THE HUNTER BLOG 
“This Week in Richmond Criminal Defense” is the blog at the center 
of this controversy.93  A reader may directly access the blog on the 
Internet or through a link on Hunter’s firm’s website, 
www.hunterlipton.com.94  Prior to the Supreme Court of Virginia’s 
decision, the news on the blog primarily consisted of detailed summaries 
of Hunter’s clients’ cases.95  Hunter revealed his clients’ first and last 
names in most of the blog posts, although occasionally he posted only a 
last name or a last name and a first initial.96  In a few of the posts, 
Hunter’s clients’ names were omitted, however, even in those posts, 
adequate detail was provided from which the public would have been 
able to discern the clients’ identities.97 
Many of Hunter’s blog posts described dismissals, dropped charges, 
and not guilty verdicts, yet the information provided still could have 
been potentially embarrassing or detrimental to his clients.  For 
 
 91. Id. cmt. 3 (emphasis added). 
 92. Id. cmt. 18. 
 93. See This Week in Richmond Criminal Defense, HUNTER & LIPTON PC, 
http://hunterlipton.com/news.php (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Brief for Appellee, supra note 19, at 2.  At the October 18, 2011 hearing, the 
Virginia State Board “entered all of the blog posts Hunter had posted on his blog to date. . 
. .  Of these thirty unique posts, only five discussed legal, policy issues.  The remaining 
twenty-five discussed cases.  Hunter represented the defendant in twenty-two of these 
cases and identified that fact in the posts.” Hunter v. Va. State Bar ex rel. Third Dist. 
Comm., 744 S.E.2d 611, 614 (Va. 2013), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2871 (2013). 
 96. See Complaint, Exhibit 2, Hunter, 744 S.E.2d 611 (No. 121472). 
 97. Brief for Appellee, supra note 19, at 6–12. 
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example, when discussing one client, Hunter wrote, “[t]o be sure, there 
is no doubt that she was shop lifting.”98  Regarding another blog post, 
Hunter wrote that his client, who was later found not guilty, “tested 
positive for cocaine.”99  One of Hunter’s clients was a schoolteacher who 
was arrested for assaulting another teacher, but the charges were 
ultimately dismissed.100  The blog included the client’s first initial and 
last name, the date of the incident, the alleged victim’s name, and the 
name of the school where they both worked.101  These types of blog 
posts formed the basis of the Virginia State Bar’s disciplinary proceeding 
against Hunter. 
A. The Hunter Case 
On March 24, 2011, the Third District Committee of the Virginia 
State Bar notified Virginia attorney Horace Frazier Hunter that it 
scheduled a disciplinary hearing because Hunter’s blog posts lacked the 
requisite advertising disclaimer and because he impermissibly revealed 
his clients’ confidential information.102  What followed the October 18, 
2011 disciplinary hearing was a finding that Hunter violated the Virginia 
Rules of Professional Conduct regarding attorney advertising and 
confidentiality, which Hunter appealed to a three-judge circuit court.103  
The Virginia circuit court, in an unpublished decision, agreed that 
Hunter’s blog required a disclaimer, but reversed and dismissed the 
confidentiality violation as an impermissible restriction of Hunter’s First 
Amendment right to free speech.104 
The parties appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia, and it issued 
its opinion on February 28, 2013.105  Upon review, the Supreme Court 
Virginia affirmed the circuit court’s determination that an advertising 
disclaimer was required on the blog, which it deemed to be commercial 
speech, and affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of the breach of client 
 
 98. Complaint, Exhibit 2, supra note 96, at 68. 
 99. Brief for Appellee, supra note 19, at 10. 
 100. Id. at 7–8. 
 101. Complaint, Exhibit 2, supra note 96, at 66. 
 102. Letter from Renu Mago Brennan, Asst. Bar Counsel, Virginia State Bar, to Horace 
Frazier Hunter, Esq. (Mar. 24, 2011) (on file with author).  See also Hunter v. Va. State 
Bar ex rel. Third Dist. Comm., 744 S.E.2d 611, 614 (Va. 2013), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
2871 (2013). 
 103. In re Hunter, No. 11-032-084907 (Va. 3d Dist. Comm. of Va. State Bar (Nov. 8, 
2011)) (on file with author). 
 104. Va. State Bar ex rel. Third Dist. Comm. v. Hunter, Case No. CL12-335-7 (Va. Cir. 
Ct. June 29, 2012) (on file with author). 
 105. Hunter, 744 S.E.2d 611. 
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confidentiality claim based on the First Amendment.106  The court 
devoted approximately three and one-half pages of its twenty-three-page 
opinion to the Virginia State Bar’s contention that its Rule 1.6 on 
confidentiality prevents attorneys, such as Hunter, from revealing 
information about a client that may be embarrassing or detrimental, 
notwithstanding the fact that the information may have been revealed in 
a public forum or record, and despite the First Amendment.107  Hunter 
filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court on the 
advertising disclaimer issue, and the Virginia State Bar filed a conditional 
cross-petition.108  The Supreme Court declined to hear the case in June 
2013.109 
B. The Hunter Opinion   
One of the central themes of First Amendment jurisprudence is 
preventing state regulations that will have a chilling effect on free 
speech.110  Ironically, however, the Supreme Court of Virginia’s 
application of First Amendment jurisprudence may have actually chilled 
the flow of free speech from client to attorney.  The Virginia State Bar 
urged the court to focus its inquiry on the speaker—an attorney—and 
the way the speaker gained access to the disclosed information—
through the attorney-client relationship.111  Instead, the Supreme Court 
of Virginia appears to have focused on the nature of the information and 
when the information was disclosed—purportedly public record 
information disclosed after the conclusion of the case.112  The court 
framed the issue before it in the following manner: “Thus, we are called 
upon to answer whether the state may prohibit an attorney from 
discussing information about a client or former client that is not 
protected by attorney-client privilege without express consent from that 
client.  We agree with Hunter that it may not.”113 
 
 106. Id. at 621. 
 107. Id. at 619–20. 
 108. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 20; Conditional Cross Petition, Hunter, 
744 S.E.2d 611. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Lamont v. Postmaster General of United States, 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965); 
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 194 (1952) (Black, J., concurring). 
 111. Brief for Appellee, supra note 19, at 8–9, 30–31. 
 112. Hunter v. Va. State Bar ex rel. Third Dist. Comm., 744 S.E.2d 611, 619–20 (Va. 
2013), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2871 (2013). 
 113. Id. at 619. 
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The court seemed to conflate Rule 1.6 on confidentiality and the 
entire doctrine of agency and doctrine of fiduciary law into the narrow 
definition of attorney-client privilege.114  In reaching its determination 
on this issue, the court failed to consider the issue of confidentiality and 
the language of Virginia’s Rule 1.6, which prohibits the disclosure of 
embarrassing or detrimental information, and it did not even 
acknowledge the delineated exceptions to the rule.115  Peter Joy points 
out,  
In effect, the Virginia Supreme Court has created a public records or 
public knowledge exception to client confidentiality, which erodes the 
duty of loyalty lawyers owe current and former clients . . . .  Now, 
lawyers can embarrass and humiliate former clients with impunity as 
long as they use confidential information that is in the public records.  
The court’s ruling is in direct contradiction with the rules of professional 
conduct.116 
As Richard Zitrin suggested, “[t]he worst part of the Hunter court’s 
decision was not the court’s analysis of Hunter’s blog, but its 
misinterpretation of its own rule on confidentiality.”117 
Certainly, if an individual is arrested on drug charges but avoids 
conviction because of a successful motion to suppress the evidence, then 
those facts may be in the public record.  But, unless that individual is a 
high profile member of the community, few people are aware of the 
arrest or aware of the suppression motion.  Are all of the facts subject to 
the attorney-client privilege?  No.  If this individual and these facts are 
discussed in a blog, might it cause embarrassment or detriment when, 
for example, a future employer conducts a Google search of this 
individual?  Of course. 
Essentially, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that it is irrelevant 
whether an attorney’s blog post is embarrassing or detrimental to his 
client, as long as the information in the blog is part of the public 
record.118  The definition of “public record” is unclear, however, it 
appears to apply to matters that are discussed in open court, even if the 
 
 114. See id. 
 115. See id. at 619–20. 
 116. Peter A. Joy, quoted in David L. Hudson, Jr., Commercial Ahead: Virginia Supreme 
Court Holds that Advertising Rules May be Applied to a Lawyer’s Blog, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2013, 
at 20, 21, available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/virginia_ 
supreme_court_holds_that_advertising_rules_may_be_applied_to_a_law/. 
 117. Richard Zitrin, Viewpoint: Guard Your Clients’ Public Secrets, THE RECORDER (June 
7, 2013), available at http://www.uchastings.edu/news/articles/2013/06/zitrin-client-
secrets.php. 
 118. Hunter, 744 S.E.2d at 619–20. 
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information is not recorded in an official court document.119  Regardless, 
information in any form of public record can be embarrassing or 
detrimental for a client.120  The Virginia State Bar provided the court 
with numerous examples of Hunter’s blog posts, yet, perhaps more 
compelling than the blog posts were the references to the testimony in 
the disciplinary hearing record from some of Hunter’s clients.121  One of 
Hunter’s clients who was acquitted on charges of aggravated malicious 
wounding and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony testified 
that he was upset and angry about Hunter’s blog because he found it to 
be “embarrassing, dangerous, and harmful.”122  Hunter used this client’s 
full name on his blog.123  Additionally, the teacher, mentioned above, 
whose assault charges were dropped testified that the blog posts were 
embarrassing and potentially detrimental to his career.124 
In considering the possible consequences of these blog posts, query 
the likelihood of a third party accessing the information about Hunter’s 
clients if it was not posted on the Internet.  Webpages are archived and 
can exist indefinitely.125  Hunter’s client, whose blood tested positive for 
cocaine but was found not guilty at trial, may still find herself 
condemned as a cocaine-user in cyberspace.126  The Hunter court’s 
opinion does not consider the potential repercussions of such blog posts. 
 
 119. See Jeff Day, Panel Admonishes Criminal Defense Attorney For Blog Naming Clients, 
Omitting Disclaimer, BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.bna.com/ 
panel-admonishes-criminal-n12884904453/.  Jeff Day reports about Virginia Bar Counsel 
Jim McCauley: 
McCauley disputed Hunter’s contention that client names are necessarily 
revealed to the public in open court and in court records.  The state’s general 
district courts are not courts of record . . . . 
  McCauley maintained that rapid-fire criminal trials in district court are not 
open trials.  The short form on which judges record decisions have no details 
on the cases and thus do not constitute a public record of a trial . . . .  Unless 
the case is detailed in an easily accessible public record, Hunter’s claim has no 
basis . . . . 
Id. 
 120. Hunter maintained information on his blog explaining the reasons for plea 
bargains, dismissals, and dropped charges.  See Complaint, Exhibit 2, supra note 96, at 3, 
9, 27, 29. 
 121. Brief for Appellee, supra note 19, at 6–12. 
 122. Id. at 9. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 8. 
 125. See INTERNET ARCHIVE, http://archive.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). 
 126. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 19, at 10–11. 
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Instead of analyzing the blog posts under confidentiality Rule 1.6 
and providing an appropriate weighing of the significance of the 
attorney-client relationship and confidentiality, the Supreme Court of 
Virginia focused on the public nature of the information and the right of 
public access.127  For example, it likened the blog entries to information 
disclosed by the press.128  The court stated: 
  The VSB argues that it can prohibit an attorney from repeating 
truthful information made in a public judicial proceeding even though 
others can disseminate this information because an attorney repeating it 
could inhibit clients from freely communicating with their attorneys or 
because it would undermine public confidence in the legal profession.  
Such concerns, however, are unsupported by the evidence.  To the 
extent that the information is aired in a public forum, privacy 
considerations must yield to First Amendment protections.  In that 
respect, a lawyer is no more prohibited than any other citizen from 
reporting what transpired in the courtroom.129 
Thus, the Supreme Court of Virginia emphasized the overarching 
societal value of transparency in our criminal justice system rather than 
focusing more specifically on an attorney’s role in the legal system.130  As 
Zitrin further posited, “The core of where the Virginia court went wrong 
was its conclusion that ‘a lawyer is no more prohibited than any other 
citizen’ from talking about an old case.  Not so.  A lawyer remains at all 
times a lawyer.”131 
Numerous cases have recognized that the unique role of an attorney 
subjects him or her to greater restrictions on his or her speech than 
those imposed upon the average citizen.132  An attorney’s position is one 
 
 127. Hunter v. Va. State Bar ex rel. Third Dist. Comm., 744 S.E.2d 611, 619–20 (Va. 
2013), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2871 (2013). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 620. 
 130. For example, the Virginia Supreme Court cited to free-press cases that have 
nothing to do with attorney speech.  See id.; see also Zitrin, supra note 117 (noting the 
Hunter opinion’s reference to Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) and 
Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984)). 
 131. Zitrin, supra note 117 (quoting Hunter, 744 S.E.2d at 620). 
 132. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1076 (1991); Ohralik v. Ohio 
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 
383–84 (1977); In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 646–47 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring); 
Douglas v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 144 F.3d 364, 370 (5th Cir. 
1998); In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 1995); U.S. Dist. Ct. For E.D. Wash. 
v. Sandlin, 12 F.3d 861, 866–67 (9th Cir. 1993); The Florida Bar v. Conway, 996 So. 2d 
213 (Fla. Oct. 29, 2008) (adopting the uncontested Report of Referee, available at 
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/clerk/briefs/2008/201-400/08-326_ROR.pdf); In re 
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of trust and fidelity to his clients.133  A client believes that he can share 
information with an attorney and that the information will be held in the 
strictest of confidences.  Even as it pertains to public record information, 
it is unlikely that a criminal client expects to be the feature of his 
attorney’s blog post upon the conclusion of his case without his consent.  
The testimony from Hunter’s clients who indicated that the blog posts 
were detrimental reinforces this presumption.134  Furthermore, the 
damage to the client who finds himself the subject of his attorney’s blog 
post may be compounded by the fact that “lawyers’ statements are likely 
to be received as especially authoritative” and “‘knowledgeable, reliable 
and true’ because of attorneys’ unique access to information.”135 
The Virginia State Bar asserted that permitting attorneys to freely 
blog about their clients, based upon public record, will impede the free-
flow of information between clients and their attorneys and undermine 
the public’s confidence in the legal profession, an argument that was 
dismissed by the Supreme Court of Virginia as “unsupported by the 
evidence,” without much analysis of the utilitarian and deontological 
issues at play.136  Under both the utilitarian and deontological 
philosophies, the inhibition of attorney-client communication has 
negative consequences.137  As discussed above, from the utilitarian view, 
the greatest good for the greatest number is served by having a 
successfully functioning legal system.138  When an attorney cannot 
effectively advocate for his client because the client has withheld 
information, it results in inequities in the justice system.  Inequities in 
the justice system will also undermine public confidence in the legal 
profession.  Indeed, as the Preamble to Virginia’s rules recognizes, “a 
lawyer can be sure that preserving client confidences ordinarily serves 
 
Skinner, 740 S.E.2d 171, 172–73 (Ga. 2013); In re Comfort, 159 P.3d 1011, 1025 (Kan. 
2007); In re Landrith, 124 P.3d 467, 479–81 (Kan. 2005); Matter of Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 
829, 833–37 (Mo. 1991); Disciplinary Counsel v. Gardner, 793 N.E.2d 425, 428–31 
(Ohio 2003); Am. Motor Corp. v. Huffstutler, 575 N.E.2d 116, 120–21 (Ohio 1991); In 
re Peshek, 798 N.W.2d 879, 880 (Wis. 2011); In re Denison, No. 6192441 (Ill. Atty. Reg. 
& Disc. Comm’n Jan. 8, 2013), available at https://www.iardc.org/13PR0001CM.html; In 
re Peshek, No. 6201779 (Ill. Atty. Reg. & Disc. Comm’n Aug. 25, 2009), available at 
https://www.iardc.org/09CH0089CM.html; Erwin Chemerinsky, Silence is Not Golden: 
Protecting Lawyer Speech Under the First Amendment, 47 EMORY L.J. 859 (1998). 
 133. See supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text. 
 134. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 19, at 6–12. 
 135. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991) (quoting In re Hinds, 
449 A.2d 483, 496 (N.J. 1982)). 
 136. Hunter, 744 S.E.2d at 620. 
 137. See supra notes 61–68 and accompanying text. 
 138. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. 
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the public interest because people are more likely to seek legal advice, 
and thereby heed their legal obligations, when they know their 
communications will be private.”139 
The deontological approach highlights the concept of fidelity, and 
under this approach, the potential chilling effect of Hunter may be even 
more compelling.140  It becomes difficult to define an attorney as a 
champion of individual rights if he uses client information to the client’s 
detriment or disadvantage, regardless of whether the information is part 
of a public record.  Furthermore, as discussed above, an attorney’s 
agreement to represent a client should include the implicit promise to 
respect the client’s privacy through confidentiality.  An attorney’s 
individual right to engage in commercial speech should not take priority 
over the protection of a client’s individual right to confidentiality.  An 
attorney should maintain “absolute loyalty”141 and “undivided fidelity”142 
to the client.  
The individual harms caused by attorneys blogging about their 
clients not only may result in the client’s distrust of his lawyer, but also 
may damage the public’s confidence in the legal profession and the 
justice system.  “[T]he integrity of the judicial system would be sullied if 
courts tolerated [the disclosure of client confidences] by those who 
profess and owe undivided loyalty to their clients.”143  The duties of 
confidentiality and loyalty “instill a faith in the system necessary for the 
public to trust our legal system in the resolution of its disputes.”144  
Furthermore, “the free-speech interests of lawyers is [sic] impinged by a 
broad rule of confidentiality.  Nonetheless, despite those costs, the 
confidentiality rule reflects a considered judgment that high net social 
value justifies it.”145 
 
 139. VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2004). 
 140. See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text. 
 141. Russell, supra note 59, at 449 (citing Steven H. Goldberg, The Former Client’s 
Disqualification Gambit: A Bad Move in Pursuit of an Ethical Anomaly, 72 MINN. L. REV. 
227, 235 (1987)). 
 142. Id. (citing CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 6 (1908)). 
 143. Duncan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 646 F.2d 1020, 1027 
(5th Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds by Gibbs v. Paluk, 742 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 
1984). 
 144. Douglas v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 144 F.3d 364, 375 (5th 
Cir. 1998). 
 145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60 cmt. b (2000). 
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VI. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE RULE OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
JUXTAPOSED 
Whether Hunter’s First Amendment rights trump the legal ethics 
rule of confidentiality regarding discussion of a client’s case without 
client consent and based upon facts found in a public record is a 
question that one court answered in the affirmative for attorneys in its 
state.  However, whether the First Amendment should override a client’s 
right to confidentiality in these circumstances is an issue that continues 
to be the subject of debate not only in Virginia, but also in legal 
communities across the country that are not bound by the Virginia 
decision.146  
The tension between the First Amendment and the legal rules of 
professional conduct is not a new phenomenon.  As previously noted, 
there have been a myriad of situations in which the issue of whether the 
self-regulating nature of the legal profession and the unique role of the 
attorney in society give rise to justifiable limits on an attorney’s 
constitutional right of free speech.147  A 1979 case decided by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which upheld a Supreme 
Court of Virginia decision restricting attorneys’ speech during pending 
criminal litigation, provides a perspective that is a common thread 
running throughout this area of law.148  The Fourth Circuit stated: 
Lawyers have First Amendment rights of free speech.  They are not 
second class citizens.  They are first class citizens with many privileges 
 
 146. See Andrew Perlman, More on the Confidentiality Implications of Hunter v. Virginia 
State Bar, LEGAL ETHICS FORUM (June 9, 2013, 8:20 PM), http://www. 
legalethicsforum.com/blog/2013/06/hunter_case.html#comments; Zitrin, supra note 117. 
 147. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1076 (1991); Ohralik v. Ohio 
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 
401–02 (1977); In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 646–47 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring); 
Douglas v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 144 F.3d 364, 370 (5th Cir. 
1998); In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 1995); U.S. Dist. Ct. For E.D. Wash. 
Sandlin, 12 F.3d 861, 866–67 (9th Cir. 1993); The Florida Bar v. Conway, 996 So. 2d 
213 (Fla. Oct. 29, 2008) (adopting the uncontested Report of Referee, available at 
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/clerk/briefs/2008/201-400/08-326_ROR.pdf); In re 
Skinner, 740 S.E.2d 171, 172–73 (Ga. 2013); In re Comfort, 159 P.3d 1011, 1025 (Kan. 
2007); In re Landrith, 124 P.3d 467, 479–81 (Kan. 2005); In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 
829, 833–37 (Mo. 1991); Disciplinary Counsel v. Gardner, 793 N.E.2d 425, 428–31 
(Ohio 2003); Am. Motor Corp. v. Huffstutler, 575 N.E.2d 116, 120–21 (Ohio 1991); In 
re Peshek, 798 N.W.2d 879, 880 (Wis. 2011); In re Denison, No. 6192441 (Ill. Atty. Reg. 
& Disc. Comm. Jan. 8, 2013), available at https://www.iardc.org/13PR0001CM.html; In 
re Peshek, No. 6201779 (Ill. Atty. Reg. & Disc. Comm. Aug. 25, 2009), available at 
https://www.iardc.org/09CH0089CM.html; Chemerinsky, supra note 132. 
 148. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979). 
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not enjoyed by other citizens.  With privilege, however, goes 
responsibility, and codes of professional responsibility have traditionally 
recognized that a lawyer is subject to special disciplinary sanctions when 
he neglects his responsibility to his clients and to the public.149 
The Fourth Circuit’s observation echoes the often quoted Justice 
Cardozo declaration that membership in the legal profession is a 
“privilege burdened with conditions.”150  The Supreme Court has 
concluded that one of the burdens “requires members of the bar to 
conduct themselves in a manner compatible with the role of courts in 
the administration of justice.”151 
The idea of “the privilege and the burden” has not only been 
reviewed and debated in the areas of pre-trial publicity and gag orders, 
but also as it pertains to an attorney’s right to criticize the judiciary, to 
advertise, to provide advice, and to create exceptions to the 
confidentiality rule, such as preventing fraud upon the court and 
preventing substantial harm to others.152 
What is novel about the Hunter decision is that the court applied 
First Amendment theory to carve what some contend is an unnecessary 
and unwarranted exception to the rule of client confidentiality—public 
record information when a case has concluded.153  In fact, other state 
courts have expressly held that the rule of confidentiality is not nullified 
simply because the information has become part of the public record.154  
Although the Hunter case is one of first impression in Virginia because it 
involves Internet blogging, other states have issued ethics opinions in 
which attorneys’ First Amendment rights have been restricted on social 
media in accordance with the legal ethics rules.155 
 
 149. Id. at 366. 
 150. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 644 (1985) (quoting People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 
162 N.E. 487, 489 (1928)). 
 151. Id. at 644–45. 
 152. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 379–82; Conway, 996 So. 2d 213; Margaret Tarkington, A 
First Amendment Theory for Protecting Attorney Speech, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 27, 74 
(2011); Martyn, supra note 61, at 1330–46; Chemerinsky, supra note 132. 
 153. See Hunter v. Va. State Bar ex rel. Third Dist. Comm., 744 S.E.2d 611, 619–20 
(Va. 2013), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2871 (2013). 
 154. In re Anonymous, 654 N.E.2d 1128, 1129 (Ind. 1995); In re Bryan, 61 P.3d 641, 
656–57 (Kan. 2003); Akron Bar Ass’n v. Holder, 810 N.E.2d 426, 434–35 (Ohio 2004); 
Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. McGraw, 461 S.E.2d 850, 860–63 (W. Va. 1995); In re 
Harman, 628 N.W.2d 351, 361 (Wis. 2001). 
 155. Conway, 996 So. 2d 213 (upholding public reprimand for comments attorney 
made about a judge on a blog, including referring to her as an “EVIL UNFAIR WITCH”); 
In re Skinner, 740 S.E.2d 171, 172–73 (Ga. 2013) (finding violation of Rule 1.6 resulting 
from an attorney posting confidential information about a client on the Internet in 
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Professor Margaret Tarkington, although a frequent critic of the 
restriction of attorneys’ free speech rights, has expressed disagreement 
with the Hunter decision.156  Tarkington’s access-to-justice approach for 
evaluating the protection of attorney speech provides that “the core 
protection for attorney speech must consist of attorney speech that is 
key to the proper and constitutional functioning of the United States 
justice system.”157  The Hunter court’s protection of Hunter’s blog posts 
that breach client confidentiality fails Tarkington’s test as she explains in 
her comments on the Legal Ethics Forum: 
  I think the [Hunter] opinion is absolutely wrong . . . .  I think the 
state constitutionally can forbid attorneys from violating the traditional 
(and even quite broad) duty of confidentiality.  This is the whole point 
to my access-to-justice approach to the First Amendment[].  Traditional 
First Amendment doctrines fail to illuminate what attorney speech must 
be protected (such as speech essential to providing legal advice to clients 
or to invoke the law on behalf of clients, and overarchingly, speech 
necessary to invoke or avoid government power in the protection of 
client life, liberty, and property), and, conversely, the traditional 
doctrines do not illuminate what attorney speech constitutionally can 
and should be prohibited. 
  As you know, my view is that the First Amendment as applied to 
attorney speech must be keyed to the attorney’s role in the system of 
justice in protecting client life, liberty, and property (or depriving others 
of life, liberty, or property—for example, a prosecutor).  Thus 
restrictions on speech essential to that role are constitutional under my 
theory—and confidentiality would be a prime example.  Attorneys have 
access to client information solely because of the delegation of state 
power to them to practice law, to discover the most embarrassing and 
terrible information possible about people.  That information is provided 
 
response to negative reviews the client had posted about the attorney on consumer 
websites); In re Peshek, 798 N.W.2d 879, 880–81 (Wis. 2011) (suspending attorney’s 
license for 60 days after she posted information about her clients on her blog).  See also 
Complaint, ¶ 12, In re Denison, No. 6192441 (Ill. Atty. Reg. & Disc. Comm., Jan. 8, 
2013), available at https://www.iardc.org/13PR0001CM.html (accusing attorney of 
committing misconduct in violation of Rule 8.2 based on blog posts alleging corruption 
in the Illinois probate system); Complaint, ¶ 13, In Re Peshek, No. 6201779 (Ill. Atty. 
Reg. & Disc. Comm., Aug. 25, 2009), available at https://www.iardc.org/ 
09CH0089CM.html. 
 156. See Tarkington, supra note 152, at 33 (noting that “it was never satisfactory to 
treat attorneys as having relinquished their First Amendment rights as a condition of 
membership in the bar. . . .  There are scenarios . . . where the judiciary has 
demonstrated a failure to protect speech that clearly should enjoy constitutional 
protection”). Id.  See also infra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 157. Tarkington, supra note 152, at 61. 
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to the attorney for the express purpose that the attorney will be able to 
use the information to invoke and/or avoid government power on behalf 
of that person.  As an essential component of the role of the lawyer, 
Virginia and other states can constitutionally prohibit attorneys from 
disclosing information about their clients outside of what is necessary 
for this role, unless the client consents. 
  As a matter of First Amendment theory, these ideas are reflected in 
the work of Alexander Meiklejohn and Wittgenstein.  Wittgenstein 
argues generally that speech protection must be keyed to the “form of 
life” in which it exists.  Thus, as applied to the system of justice, speech 
regulation and protection must preserve that form of life—and here, our 
system of justice as a “form of life” requires confidentiality.  Alexander 
Meiklejohn uses the town meeting as an example.  Although political 
speech is absolutely protected in town meetings, yet it is and must be 
abridged (for example, through rules and regulations about who speaks 
when, and order by the chair, etc.).  The abridgment is necessary to 
accomplish the governmental purpose—that is, the purpose of holding 
the town meeting.  While manipulation of the process cannot be allowed 
through abridging just one side of an issue, for example, abridgment 
through creating rules of the game is essential to preserve the process 
itself. 
  In like manner, there are many restrictions on attorney speech that 
are essential to the proper functioning of the attorney’s role in the 
system of justice and as an advocate for her client.  These regulations are 
constitutional precisely because they make it possible for the speech 
essential to our system of justice to take place.  Without confidentiality, 
clients don’t talk, a lawyer’s knowledge in pursuing legal remedies 
becomes limited, and, more importantly, state powers and processes to 
discover information through the justice system can be used by attorneys 
(who are licensed with state power to discover such information for 
these very purposes) to instead embarrass and undermine clients—and 
perhaps even harm their reputation and property.  As you know, there 
are plenty of regulations on attorney speech that I think are 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment and that I have written 
about.  But confidentiality is not unconstitutional; instead, it is an 
essential aspect of the attorney’s role in our system of justice.158 
 
 158. Margaret Tarkington, Comment to John Steele, Lawyer Blogs, Public Facts, and 
Confidentiality (or, that Blogging Criminal Defense Lawyer From Virginia Won on First 
Amendment Grounds), LEGAL ETHICS FORUM (Feb. 28, 2013, 3:37 PM), Comment posted 
Feb. 28, 2013, 10:46 PM, http://www.legalethicsforum.com/blog/2013/02/lawyer-blogs-
public-facts-and-confidentiality-or-that-blogging-criminal-defense-lawyer-won-on-first-
.html. 
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Hunter’s position on the First Amendment does not dispute that 
there is some need for client confidentiality, but rather, he discards the 
value or necessity of it after the case becomes part of a public record.159  
The argument is strident not only in its defense of First Amendment 
freedoms, but also in discounting any obligation to the client, regardless 
of how embarrassing and detrimental to the client the information may 
be.160  Although the Hunter briefs contain significant argument about 
whether Hunter’s blog is political or commercial speech, and therefore 
which level of scrutiny should apply regarding the attorney advertising 
regulations, the fundamental underlying concerns about the value of 
confidentiality should not significantly change whether the breach of 
client confidentiality is attacked based upon a strict scrutiny political 
speech standard or a substantial state interest commercial speech 
analysis.161 
Why does the character of the speech not matter?  Because if the 
legal profession accepts that the attorney is bound to maintain 
confidentiality based upon the ethics rules and principles of agency, 
fiduciary, and contract law, then is not the logical extension of that 
idiom an obligation not to breach confidentiality except through an 
established exception?  In other words, conceding the value of political 
and commercial speech, has an attorney not agreed in the context of his 
relationship with a client to refrain from exercising free speech that may 
be embarrassing or detrimental to the client?  The legal profession has 
not disavowed general free speech rights, but rather, in an effort to 
provide better advocacy, the profession has concluded that client 
confidentiality is indispensable to support both the client and the legal 
system. 
As a self-regulating profession, has the legal profession therefore 
cornered itself with no way out of this First Amendment “dilemma” 
other than through the assistance of the courts?  The answer is of course 
not, because there is always the option of obtaining client consent.  If 
Hunter had obtained client consent, this entire discussion would be 
unnecessary.  He conceded that there was a commercial aspect to his 
blog, but he primarily relied on a political speech argument in which he 
 
 159. Reply Brief for Appellant at 1–11, Hunter v. Va. State Bar ex rel. Third Dist. 
Comm., 744 S.E.2d 611 (Va. 2013) (No. 121472). 
 160. Id. 
 161. See generally Opening Brief for Appellant, Hunter, 744 S.E.2d 611 (No. 121472); 
Brief for Appellee, Hunter, 744 S.E.2d 611 (No. 121472); Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (explaining the test for political speech); Central 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) 
(explaining the test for commercial speech). 
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asserted that he was blogging about his clients’ cases to expose flaws in 
the criminal justice system and to bring about change.162  Does a client 
not have a say in whether he wants to be a part of a campaign to effect 
change?  Is it the attorney’s case or the client’s case?  Even conceding 
Hunter’s claim that his blog is political speech (a difficult argument 
upon which to prevail for any attorney who is marketing himself on 
social media),163 is there not a compelling state interest in upholding the 
sanctity of client confidentiality?  Client confidentiality is the bedrock of 
the attorney-client relationship, and in turn, a lynchpin in the structure 
of our legal system.  Is not the rule of confidentiality narrowly tailored, 
as it is replete with compelling exceptions, including client consent?164  
Moreover, if an attorney would rather not seek client consent or 
cannot obtain client consent, but believes that there is value in sharing 
the story of the client’s case, then the attorney may discuss the case in a 
hypothetical manner.165  Hunter could write about his clients’ real-life 
cases and still accomplish his commercial speech goals, as well as 
purported political speech goals, without including client names or 
detailed personal information.  He could discuss the ramifications of 
having a client who has allegedly tested positive for cocaine and the 
various strategies for challenging the test and defending the case.  In 
 
 162. Compare In re Denison, No. 6192441 (Ill. Atty. Reg. & Disc. Comm’n, Jan. 8, 
2013), available at https://www.iardc.org/13PR0001CM.html (accusing attorney of 
committing misconduct in violation of Rule 8.2 based on blog posts alleging corruption 
in the Illinois probate system), and The Florida Bar v. Conway, 996 So. 2d 213 (Fla. Oct. 
29, 2008) (adopting the uncontested Report of Referee, available at http://www. 
floridasupremecourt.org/clerk/briefs/2008/201-400/08-326_ROR.pdf) (upholding public 
reprimand for comments attorney made about a judge on a blog, including referring to 
her as an “EVIL UNFAIR WITCH”), with In re Skinner, 740 S.E.2d 171, 172–73 (Ga. 
2013) (finding violation of Rule 1.6 resulting from an attorney posting confidential 
information about a client on the Internet in response to negative reviews the client had 
posted about the attorney on consumer websites), and In re Peshek, 798 N.W.2d 879, 
880–81 (Wis. 2011) (suspending attorney’s license for 60 days after she posted 
information about her clients on her blog). 
 163. In fact, a new ethics opinion was just released by the New York State Bar 
Association in which it defined blogs as advertising unless the blog does not discuss legal 
topics and its primary purpose is not the retention of the lawyer.  N.Y. State Bar Ass’n 
Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 967 (2013), available at http://www.nysba.org/ 
CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=28100. 
 164. A constitutional analysis of the doctrines of political and commercial speech and 
the various circumstances under which attorney speech may be restricted based upon 
confidentiality is beyond the scope of this Article, which seeks to explore the ethical 
issues regarding Hunter’s blog posts and the potential impact of the Supreme Court of 
Virgina’s opinion. 
 165. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 4 (1980). 
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fact, comment 4 to Model Rule 1.6 contemplates such a situation: an 
attorney’s use of a hypothetical modeled from a real case is allowed “so 
long as there is no reasonable likelihood that the listener will be able to 
ascertain the identity of the client or situation the situation involved.”166 
Unfortunately, it appears that the Supreme Court of Virginia neither 
analyzed the alternatives of client consent or the use of hypotheticals, 
nor addressed the intrinsic value of maintaining client confidentiality as 
the sacrosanct characteristic of the attorney-client relationship.167  These 
issues remain critical to the ongoing discussion of client confidentiality 
and the role of the attorney in the digital age.  The Internet affords 
tremendous opportunity to provide the public with access to legal 
information and to promote reform, but it also may be a vehicle to inflict 
unwarranted harm upon an individual client.  Fidelity has been referred 
to as “the sister of justice,”168 so it follows that when information that is 
embarrassing or detrimental to a client is posted on the Internet, thereby 
diluting the fidelity of the attorney-client relationship, our system of 
justice likewise suffers. 
CONCLUSION 
Becoming an attorney is a voluntary act.  Entering into an attorney-
client relationship generally is also a voluntary act.169  The moment that 
the attorney-client relationship commences, an attorney is bound to 
maintain a client’s confidences based upon agency, fiduciary, contract 
law, and the code of professional responsibility.  Does this obligation of 
confidentiality, which reflects the loyalty, trust, and fidelity that are the 
underpinnings of the relationship, magically expire upon the completion 
of the case?  Certainly, Virginia’s comment 18 to Rule 1.6 states 
otherwise,170 as does Rule 1.9 governing conflicts with former clients.171  
If an attorney is prohibited from using the information learned in a 
representation to the detriment of a former client, should he be able to 
 
 166. Id. 
 167. See Hunter v. Va. State Bar ex rel. Third Dist. Comm., 744 S.E.2d 611 (Va. 2013), 
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2871 (2013). 
 168. HORACE, THE ODES: BOOK I:XXIV A LAMENT FOR QUINTILIUS (A.S. Kline trans., 
2003), available at http://www.poetryintranslation.com/PITBR/Latin/HoraceOdesBkI. 
htm. 
 169. That is, with the understanding that there are exceptions, such as court 
appointed obligations. 
 170. VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 18 (2004). 
 171. VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9. 
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use it to the current client’s public detriment?172  Again, there is no 
stated exception to the confidentiality rule for material that appears in a 
public record.173  
The Hunter opinion dilutes the fidelity that is intrinsic in the 
attorney-client relationship and challenges the public trust.  Members of 
the public are better served by the assurance that whatever occurs in 
their individual legal cases will not become the subject of a blog or 
otherwise be posted on the Internet by their attorney with whom they 
entered into a fiduciary relationship.   
Virginia is only one state and Horace Hunter is only one lawyer in 
that state, but imagine lawyers all over the country freely blogging, 
updating Facebook statuses, and tweeting the details of their clients’ 
cases just because the facts may be found in a public record after the 
matter is completed.174  While the Supreme Court has not opined on an 
 
 172. Id.  Rule 1.9 states, in relevant part: 
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose 
present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not 
thereafter: 
(1) use information relating to or gained in the course of the 
representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 
or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the 
information has become generally known; or 
(2) reveal information relating to the representation except as Rule 1.6 or 
Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client. 
Id.  Of course, Rule 1.9 refers back to Rule 1.6, so arguably, if an attorney may publish 
confidential information to the client’s detriment under Rule 1.6, then perhaps it also 
dilutes a client’s protection under Rule 1.9. See id. 
 173. While the Hunter opinion did not focus on the distinction between information 
that is generally available and information that is generally known, it is interesting to 
note that The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers is in accord with the 
idea that information that is known by others is not a reason for an attorney to breach 
confidentiality.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 59 cmt. b 
(2000).  However, the Restatement does distinguish information that becomes “generally 
known” and provides permission for an attorney to speak about a client’s case based 
upon generally known information. Id. § 59 cmt. d.  Whether “generally available” is the 
same as “generally known” is a subject of debate.  While high profile cases that are 
televised and discussed frequently in all forms of media may fit the description of 
generally known, most individuals, like Horace Hunter’s clients, live lives under the 
proverbial radar.  Their private affairs, including a criminal matter, are usually not 
generally known or generally available and, therefore, if disclosed, are easily a subject of 
embarrassment and detriment in their lives. See Chavkin, supra note 41, 257–60; Zitrin, 
supra note 117. 
 174. The Hunter opinion has not only raised concerns about its impact on other states’ 
legal ethics rules, but also about the potential long range effect on other professions as 
well as an individual’s general right to privacy.  See Perlman, supra note 146 (suggesting 
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attorney’s free speech rights regarding client confidentiality in the 
context of Internet blogging, the Court’s guidance, offered in 1959, 
seems to have stood the test of time and technology: 
A lawyer belongs to a profession with inherited standards of propriety 
and honor, which experience has shown necessary in a calling dedicated 
to the accomplishment of justice.  He who would follow that calling 
must conform to those standards. 
  Obedience to ethical precepts may require abstention from what in 
other circumstances might be constitutionally protected speech.175 
Confidentiality is one of the ethical precepts that sometimes demand 
abstention in order to maintain dedication to the legal profession’s 
“inherited standards” of fidelity, propriety, and honor, which are the 
cornerstones of the attorney-client relationship.  “We count on the space 
of trust that confidentiality provides.  When someone breaches that 
trust, we are all worse off for it.”176  
 
 
that doctors are also in a position of trust with their clients, and under the Hunter court’s 
reasoning, the laws protecting patient privacy arguably violate doctors’ First Amendment 
rights).  Note also that the Supreme Court has recognized limited First Amendment 
rights for other professions, such as government employees. See Connick v. Myers, 461 
U.S. 138 (1983) (restricting government employee speech that hampers the public 
function). 
 175. In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 646–47 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 176. Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks to the Press on Release of 
Purportedly Confidential Documents by Wikileaks, (Nov. 29, 2010), available at 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/11/152078.htm. 
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